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ABSTRACT: Alexander of Aphrodisias’ comment to the arguments on the principle 
known as of excluded middle, held by Aristotle in Metaphysics Γ 7-8, seems to interpret 
that text in a predominantly logical and philosophical perspective, and considers the 
subsequent research carried out in different fields. This perspective emerges from the 
particular importance that the exegete gives to not only the concepts of true and false 
with respect to the principle’s formula (“For neither can there be anything intermediate 
of a contradiction, but of one thing we must either affirm or deny one thing, whatever 
it is” 1011b 23-24) and its first proof, but also to the axioms and the concept of 
contradiction. The attribution to the principle of a meaning closely related to those 
concepts can, moreover, be traced back to Alexander. The reason for Alexander’s 
interpretative choice could be found in his own conception of first philosophy as a 
demonstrative science, which seems to discover a consistent criterion for truth in the 
principle, thus establishing the existence of something true and how to find it. 
However, such a requirement would be purely Alexandrian, because in Aristotle, as can 
be demonstrated by the texts, the truth is nothing more than the discourse which 
describes reality as it is. In fact, the truth expresses a relationship between terms, and 
this relationship may be said to subsist, in the case of the affirmative statement, or not 
subsist, in the case of denial. 
RE  SUME  : Le commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise sur le principe dit du tiers exclu, 
tenu par Aristote dans la Metaphysique Γ 7-8, semble interpréter ce texte dans une 
perspective logique et philosophique et prend en compte les recherches ultérieures dans 
différents domaines. Cette perspective vient de l’importance particulière que l’exégète 
donne non seulement aux concepts de vrai et de faux en ce qui concerne la formule du 
principe (“Il n’y a pas d’intermédiaire d’une contradiction, mais pour une chose il faut 
ou bien affirmer ou bien nier une chose, quoi qu’il s’agisse” 1011b23-24) et sa première 
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preuve, mais aussi aux axiomes et au concept de contradiction. L’attribution du principe 
d’une signification étroitement liée à ces concepts peut, de plus, être retracée jusqu’à 
Alexandre. La raison du choix d’interprétation d’Alexander pourrait être trouvée dans 
sa propre conception de la première philosophie comme une science démonstrative, qui 
semble découvrir un critère cohérent pour la vérité dans le principe, établissant ainsi 
l’existence de quelque chose de vrai et comment le trouver. Cependant, une telle 
exigence serait purement alexandrienne, parce que pour Aristote, comme on peut le 
démontrer dans les textes, la vérité n’est rien de plus que le discours qui décrit la réalité 
comme elle est. En fait, la vérité exprime une relation entre des termes et on peut dire 
que cette relation subsiste, dans le cas de la déclaration affirmative, ou ne subsiste pas, 
dans le cas d’un démenti. 
KEYWORDS: Aristotle; Alexander of Aphrodisias; Excluded Middle; Metaphysics; 
Principle; Axiom; Contradiction; True False; Affirmation Negation 
The following considerations examine a specific passage in Alexander of 
Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ. In this passage the 
commentator explains the formulation of the principle known as of 
excluded middle, exposed by Aristotle at the beginning of Metaphysics Γ 7, 
and the first argument Aristotle added to prove this principle by way of 
refutation.  
There are few studies on Alexander’s comment of book Γ. The 
studies carried out by K. L. Flannery are eminent1 among the general 
studies, critical editions and translations.2 He is the author of a 
monograph dedicated to the logic of Alexander. This work, however, 
mainly refers to the comment of Analytics and illustrates how Alexander 
interprets the various syllogisms and their philosophical importance. 
Therefore, in relation to the problem analyzed here, Flannery’s most 
                                                        
1 K.L. Flannery, Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Leiden, Brill, 1995; 
K.L. Flannery, “Logic and Ontology in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Commentary on 
Metaphysics IV”, in G. Movia (ed.), Alessandro di Afrodisia e la Metafisica di Aristotele, 
Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2003, p. 117-134. 
2 See Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, edidit H. 
Bonitz, Berolini, Reimer, 1847; Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica 
Commentaria, edidit M. Hayduck, Berolini, Reimer, 1891; Alexander of Aphrodisias, On 
Aristotle Metaphysics 4, trans. A. Madigan SJ, London, Duckworth, 1993; Alessandro di 
Afrodisia, Commentario alla Metafisica di Aristotele, G. Movia (ed.), Milano, Bompiani, 
2007; M. Casu, “Commento al libro Γ”, in Alessandro di Afrodisia, Commentario alla 
Metafisica di Aristotele, p. 559-848. 
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relevant article is the one which examines in detail some parts of 
Alexander’s comment on Metaphysics Γ. His study is part of the 
proceedings of a conference held in Cagliari in April 1999 entirely 
dedicated to the relationship between Alexander and Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics.3 Flannery argues in this work that Alexander often tends to 
interpret as demonstrative the arguments in which Aristotle refers to the 
level of signification. Alexander does in fact believe that philosophy is a 
demonstrative science and so, influenced by that conception, 
occasionally deviates from Aristotle’s text.4  
M. Bonelli, however, in a monograph on Alexander’s metaphysics, 
uses as her main source the comment of Alexander on Metaphysics Γ.5 
The purpose of her work, chronologically situated after Flannery’s 
monograph and before the conference in Cagliari, is to show how, in 
Alexander’s opinion, philosophy must be intended as a demonstrative 
science with definite objects and features. In this context her research 
also addresses the issue of axioms, even if from a general point of view. 
M. Bonelli points out that, according to Alexander’s interpretation, 
axioms are indemonstrable truths that are involved in demonstrative 
arguments. Indeed, philosophy is, for Alexander, a science whose 
argumentations originate from these improvable truths.6 
Even at the conference of Cagliari, M. Mignucci dealt with 
Alexander’s comment of a specific Aristotelian argument which proves 
the principle of non-contradiction.7 He looks for a more objective 
interpretation compared to Alexander of what Aristotle intended to add 
as a proof. Regarding this argument, he points out the features and 
underlines the expressions that can lead to different interpretations. Only 
                                                        
3 See Movia, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la Metafisica di Aristotele. 
4 See Flannery, “Logic and Ontology in Alexander of Aphrodisias”, p. 134. 
5 See M. Bonelli, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come scienza dimostrativa, Napoli, 
Bibliopolis, 2001. 
6 See ibid., p. 245. 
7 See M. Mignucci, “Alessandro interprete di Aristotele: luci ed ombre del 
commento a Metaph. Γ”, in Movia, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la Metafisica di Aristotele, p. 
93-116. 
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later M. Mignucci clarifies what Alexander expresses in the exegesis of 
the argument. His explanation of both Alexander’s and Aristotle’s texts 
stands in a ‘logical-philosophical’ perspective, which tends to highlight 
the formal-logical characteristics of the two texts. 
Even if these studies deal primarily with the commentary on Metaphysics 
Γ, they do not address the Alexandrian concept of the principle known 
as of excluded middle or of its proofs. Moreover, chapters 7 and 8 of 
Metaphysics Γ also have not often and specifically been studied.8 However 
it is important to analyze these passages because there are some relevant 
aspects in which Alexander departs from Aristotle and presents traits of 
originality. 
For this reason it is necessary to refer to very specific texts. As 
anticipated, the Aristotelian lines that will be analyzed are Metaphysica Γ 7, 
1011b 23-29, in which he formulates the principle known as of excluded 
middle and gives a first proof of it. I will then consider Alexander’s 
commentary on the passage in Metaphysica 328, 5-329, 4. As the 
                                                        
8 Specifically regarding the principle known as excluded middle see: T.V. Upton, 
“The principle of excluded middle and causality: Aristotle’s more complete replay to 
the determinist”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 4, 1987, p. 359-367; I. Didilescu, “Sur le 
tiers exclu chez Aristote”, Revue roumaine des sciences sociales. Série de philosophie et logique, 16, 
1972, p. 37-42, which both consider this principle referring to the problem of future 
statements and of determinism; G. Cenacchi, “I problemi intorno al principio del terzo-
escluso secondo Aristotele. Tommaso d’Aquino in relazione al pensiero 
contemporaneo”, Aquinas, 17, 1974, p. 240-263, who considers these passages, but he 
always agree with the interpretation of Tommaso and explains it in opposition with the 
intuitionism. Recently J.-B. Gourinat, “Principe de contradiction, principe du tiers-exclu 
et principe de bivalance: philosophie prémiere ou organon?”, in M. Bastit-J. Follon 
(eds), Logique et métaphysique dans l’Organon d’Aristote. Actes du colloque de Dijon, Louvain La 
Neuve-Paris-Sterling, Peeters, 2001, p. 63-91 and, W. Cavini, “Arguing from a 
Definition: Aristotle on truth and Excluded Middle”, in N. Angelis-F. Peonidis (eds), 
Aristotle on logic, language and science, Thessaloniki, Sakkoulas, 1998, p. 3-15, Id., “Principia 
contradictionis. Sui princìpi aristotelici della contraddizione (§§ 1-3)”, Antiquorum 
philosophia. An international journal, 1, 2008, p. 123-169, which both stand in a ‘logical-
philosophical’ perspective, consider the meaning of the principle known as excluded 
middle compared to the demonstrative arguments and the meaning of the principle of 
non-contradiction. Some considerations on the principle known as excluded middle 
could also be found in more general studies, for exemple: C.A.Viano, La logica di 
Aristotele, Torino, Taylor, 1955; A. Stevens, L’ontologie d’Aristote au carrefour du logique et du 
réel, Paris, Vrin, 2000; J. Barnes, Truth, etc. Six Lectures on Ancient Logic, Oxford-New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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methodology, at first I will present the Aristotelian conception and then 
I will show how Alexander’s interpretation is original in its divergence 
from Aristotle. 
The Aristotelian formula of the principle that is commonly known as of 
excluded middle is the following: 
For neither can there be anything intermediate in a contradiction, but of one thing 
we must either affirm or deny one thing, whatever it is.9 
Aristotle’s formula asserts only that there is nothing intermediate 
between what is opposed in the contradictory way. Of one thing, in fact, 
it is only possible to affirm or deny one thing, whatever it is. 
It is clear from the text that Aristotle does not explicitly state 
whether the principle should be reported to the opposition between 
‘things’ ( ), namely terms or states of affairs, or ‘propositions’ 
( ), namely sentences.10 The concepts of intermediate, contradiction, 
affirmation and negation, which Aristotle uses to formulate the principle, 
refer to both types of opposition. Indeed, not only contradictory 
statements, such as “Socrates is sitting” and “Socrates is not sitting”, are 
opposed, but also the state of affairs described in those propositions, 
namely “the sitting of Socrates” and “the not sitting of Socrates”. The 
                                                        
9 Aristot. Metaph. Γ 7, 1011b23-24:
. 
10 I agree with the translations of H.G. Apostle, in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. 
Hippocrates G. Apostle, Bloomington-London, Indiana University Press, 1966; C. 
Kirwan, in Aristotle, Metaphysics. Books Γ, Δ and Ε, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 19932 
(19711); J. Barnes, in The complete works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, vol. II, p. 1597, which do not add a 
referring to terms as: P. Eusebietti, in Aristotele, La metafisica, con una introduzione 
storica analitica e filosofica a cura di E. Oggioni, Padova, 1950, p. 496; G. Reale, in 
Aristotele, Metafisica, Milano, Bompiani, 2004, (Napoli, Loffredo, 19681), p. 179; T.M. 
Calvo Martínez, in Aristóteles, Metafísica, Madrid, Biblioteca Básica Gredos, 2000, p. 
186; or a referring to propositions as: G. Colle, in Aristote, La Métaphysique, Louvain, 
Éditions de l’Institut supérieur de Philosophie, 1931, vol. III, p. 36; H. Tredennick, in 
Aristotle in twenty-three volumes, Cambridge-London, Harvard University Press-
Heinemann, 1975 (19331), vol. XVII, p. 199; J. Tricot, in Aristote, La Métaphysique, 
Paris, Vrin, 1970 (19531), p. 235.  
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latter pair of opposites, as is known, is a case of opposition between 
terms.11 
According to the principle, the opposition as contradiction, between 
both propositions and terms, is characterized by the non-existence of an 
intermediate. Specifically, it is necessary that what is opposed in a 
contradictory way be only the affirmation or the negation of one thing 
about one thing. So it is possible to show how the principle known as of 
excluded middle establishes the ‘necessary duality’ of affirmation and 
negation. 
When applied to propositions, ‘necessary duality’ means that one 
cannot express oneself differently from affirmation and negation, that is 
to say that there are not different ways of connecting a subject and a 
predicate from the attribution, expressed by the affirmation, or 
subtraction, expressed by the negation. However, if it refers to things, 
the principle asserts that a certain state of things either subsists or does 
not subsist, either it is or it is not. In other words, what is described in 
affirmative or negative speech is a connection between two objects that 
can be real or not, but there is nothing intermediate between the 
existence of this connection and its non-existence, between the 
subsistence of a certain state of affairs, described by affirmation, and the 
non-subsistence described by negation, or between being and not being 
of a particular subject.12 
It is also important to note that the principle, in the Aristotelian 
formula, does not refer to the notions of true and false. Indeed, if we 
                                                        
11 See Aristot. Cat. 10, 11b 17-23; 13b 12-33; Top. II 2, 109b 13-23. On the 
difference between the opposition of terms and the opposition of propositions, see C. 
Rossitto, “Opposizione e non contraddizione nella Metafisica di Aristotele”, in E. Berti et 
alii, La contraddizione, Roma, Città Nuova, 1977, p. 42-69; Ead., Studi sulla dialettica in 
Aristotele, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2000, esp. p. 347-366; Ead., “Aristotele, Categorie, 10. Gli 
‘opposti’ e la loro classificazione”, in M. Bonelli-F.G. Masi (eds), Studi sulle Categorie di 
Aristotele, Amsterdam, Adolf M. Hakkert, 2011, p. 249-264. 
12 As I tried to demonstrate in L. Dalla Valeria, “Il principio del ‘terzo escluso’ 
nella Metafisica di Aristotele”, Dissertazione di Dottorato di Ricerca in Filosofia, Padova, 
Università degli Studi di Padova, 2009, p. 31-63. 
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understand it as establishing the ‘necessary duality’ of affirmation and 
negation, the principle is independent from these concepts. 
Alexander’s lemma in Metaphysica 328, 5-6 contains only the first part 
of the Aristotelian formula, “for neither can there be anything 
intermediate in a contradiction”, but his comment concerns the 
complete formula and the first proof. The subject of the following 
lemma is, in fact, the second proof. 
The part of the exegesis, which seems to relate more closely to the 
formula of the principle, reads as follows: 
Having shown that it is not possible for the contraries to simultaneously subsist, 
[Aristotle] shows then by many [arguments] that there is nothing intermediate of a 
contradiction. So it could be established by these that the contradiction is not 
simultaneously false. From this could follow that the [contradiction] itself divides 
in any case the true and the false. In fact, if both [the parts of a contradiction] are 
neither simultaneously true, as has been shown, nor simultaneously false (this 
could indeed be said an intermediate of a contradiction) it remains that in every 
case one of the two parts of the same [contradiction] is true and the other false. 
So he shows that nothing is intermediate of a contradiction. It is necessary to 
assume a single contradiction: this would be possible only if it were one thing of 
one single thing ( ) that which could be both affirmed and denied. 
Indeed, if it were not one thing of one thing, there would not still be one and the 
same contradiction, but the assertions and denials would be several. This was 
discussed more extensively in De Interpretatione and in the writing On Affirmation. 
For this reason he added “one thing of one thing”.13 
                                                        
13 Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph. 328, 7-19 Hayduck: 
 My translation of this passage diverges from Madigan, in Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 4, p. 123 and Casu, “Commento al libro Γ”, p. 
771-773. It intends to be as faithful as possible to the Alexandrian structure and 
expressions and tries to avoid the introduction of excessive interpretive elements. In 
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 Alexander introduces his comment on Metaphysics Γ 7 by summarizing 
what Aristotle previously demonstrated. As is known, Aristotle in 
Metaphysics Γ 4-6 proves by refutation the validity of the principle of non-
contradiction. Alexander refers to the meaning of this principle with the 
expression “it is not possible for the contraries to simultaneously exist”. 
In this way he summarizes the arguments preceding the examination of 
the principle known as of excluded middle. He then introduces this 
principle by stating that “there isn’t anything intermediate in a 
contradiction”, as written in the lemma he cites. However, from this 
statement he draws a conclusion that is not explicit in Aristotle. Indeed, 
according to Alexander, the fact that there is no intermediate of a 
contradiction demonstrates at once that the contradictory pairs cannot 
be both false. In other words, the principle also demonstrates the 
impossibility for a contradictory pair, the one consisting in an affirmation 
and the other in a negation, to be both false. So the commentator 
introduces a concept: the concept of falsehood, which was not 
implicated in the original text. This indicates Alexander’s greater interest 
in the possibility to establish what is true and what is false, even 
regarding the so-called principle of excluded middle. It is his own 
conception, which is not so evident in the Metaphysics. 
This observation is confirmed by the subsequent exegesis in which 
Alexander deduces, from the observation that the principle of excluded 
middle means that the two sides of the contradiction cannot be 
simultaneously false, that the contradiction, which consists only and 
always of two opposites (the affirmation and the negation), always 
necessarily separates the true and the false. The reason why the 
contradiction is able to make that distinction goes back to the nature of 
the two principles discussed in book Γ. The principle of non-
                                                                                                                                  
particular, I do not agree with Madigan’s and Casu’s translations as they respectively 
translate  with ‘for’ and ‘poiché’; but also as Casu translates  with ‘enunciati 
contraddittori’. In my opinion, in fact, even if Alexander refers to propositions, it could 
not be so clear from the simple use of the noun . This way I prefer to save the 
ambiguity of the term, where it is possible. 
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contradiction, indeed, states, according to Alexander, that the two 
members of the contradiction cannot be simultaneously true, while the 
principle known as of excluded middle states that they cannot be 
simultaneously false. Therefore, if the members of a contradiction can be 
neither true nor false, they will necessarily always be one true and one 
false, although they may over time change their status and the true 
become false and the false true.14 
It is also remarkable that, in the commentator’s point of view, what 
may be considered intermediate of a contradiction is something that 
might be simultaneously false. This reveals the fact that Alexander 
considers as intermediate of contradiction an affirmation and a negation 
which are simultaneously false. He does not seem to consider the Physics 
of Aristotle, where instead the concept of intermediate is related to 
change. This concept, indeed, is defined by Aristotle as a point required 
within a process of change where there is a shift from an opposite to the 
other, for example, in the gradual change from white to black, all the 
different shades of gray are intermediate. But, precisely, it is the latter 
type of intermediate which Aristotle refers to not only in Metaphysics 
book Γ but also book I, of which unfortunately we do not have 
Alexander’s commentary.15 
The exegete, after the explanation of the principle’s formula 
according to his original view, dedicates several lines to clarifying the 
expression “one thing of one thing ( )”. Indeed, the argument 
presented must remain under this condition to be valid, meaning the 
affirmation and the negation must connect one same subject to one same 
                                                        
14 This interpretation of Alexander is precisely the one resumed in contemporary 
studies concerning the principle of excluded middle in Aristotle, almost taking for 
Aristotelian an exegesis which, as we have seen, was created by Alexander. See 
especially: Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. Contradiction and dialectic, C.W.A Whitaker (ed.), 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 79-82; Gourinat, “Principe de contradiction”, p. 70; 
Cavini, “Principia contradictionis”, in particular p. 125-135. 
15 See Aristot. Phys. I 5, 188a 36-b 8; 188b 21-26; V 1, 224b 28-35; Metaph. I 7, 
1057a 30-33; 1057b 2-4; 1057b 4-32; 1057a 21-22: “In fact, we say intermediate the 
things to which it is first necessary to change what change” (
). 
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predicate, whatever they are. Alexander rightly notes, consistently with 
Aristotle’s doctrines, that if this condition is not satisfied, there is no 
longer a single contradiction, whose members must necessarily be the 
one true and the other false, but there are many affirmations and 
negations, which are not opposed in a contradictory way. So Alexander 
refers to De Interpretatione, the work which closely examines the 
contradiction as an opposition between propositions. 
These two observations also reveal a further aspect of Alexander’s 
exegesis, namely that he considers the principle of excluded middle as 
referring to the opposition between propositions, while Aristotle’s text, 
as stated, uses a terminology which refers to both the opposition 
between propositions and between terms. 
The same perspective characterizes also his subsequent analysis of 
the first proof of the principle, while in Aristotle’s text we read: 
This is evident for he who defines what is the true and the false; indeed, the false 
is the saying that what is is not and that what is not is; the true is the saying that 
what is is and what is not is not; hence, also he who say that something is or is not 
( ) say the true or say the false, but neither what is is said 
not to be or to be [indifferently] nor what is not.16  
As can be noted, Aristotle begins the argument by asserting that the 
evidence of the principle emerges through the definition of false and 
true.17 He defines the false as “the saying that what is is not and that 
what is not is”; namely, the false is a statement declaring the existence of 
something that does not exist or the non-existence of something that 
exists. The true, on the other hand, is defined as “the saying that what is 
is and what is not is not”. Consequently, even those who claim to say 
something intermediate between affirmation and negation when 
                                                        
16 Aristot. Metaph. Γ 7, 1011b 25-29: 
 
17 I consider the definition of true and false a part of the first proof and not a part 
of principle’s formula, as I illustrated in Dalla Valeria, Il principio del ‘terzo escluso’, p. 67-
68.  
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declaring that something “is or is not” without distinction, as if the joint 
expression “is or is not” constituted a third opportunity for preaching in 
addition to affirmation and negation, say the true or the false. This is 
because, Aristotle explains, neither for what is, it is irrelevant to be or 
not to be, nor for what is not, it is irrelevant to be or not to be.18 
The characteristic of the concepts of true and false is to show more 
effectively how the discourse is related to reality, namely to what is or to 
what is not. In other words, Aristotle begins his argumentation by 
showing how what is expressed in the discourse always refers to a reality 
that is determined in a certain way. So, when the affirmation (saying that 
it is) is referred to something that actually is, then it is true: when the 
affirmation is referred to something that is not, then it is false, and 
likewise the negation. 
Aristotle refutes by this definition of true and false one who says 
that the indifferent preaching “is or is not” constitutes a kind of 
preaching intermediate between affirmation and negation. However, 
discourse is descriptive of reality, which is always determined or in the 
sense of the existence or of non existence referring to a certain state of 
affairs. So, even he who makes such a preaching is stating the true or the 
false. Indeed, if he refers to what is, it is false to say that what is “is or is 
not”, because it is. If he refers to what is not, it is false to say that what is 
not “is or is not”, because it is not. Only if one relates to a future event, 
it is true to say that it “is or is not”, because the event has not yet been 
determined, but, in this case, the expression must be understood as “will 
be or will not be”. Moreover, this expression also has its own 
contradictory expression that, referred to a future event, is false: saying 
that it will not “will be or not will be”.19 
                                                        
18 See ibid., p. 67-87; in the same interpretative current: Eusebietti, in Aristotele, 
La metafisica, p. 496; A. Russo, in Aristotele, Opere, G. Giannantoni (ed.), trans. A. 
Russo, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1973, vol. VI: Metafisica, p. 115; Calvo Martínez, in 
Aristóteles, Metafísica, p. 186. 
19 See Aristot. De interpr. 9, 19a23-32: “What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what 
is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is; and 
not everything that is not, necessarily is not. For to say that is, is of necessity, when it is, 
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Hence, from the Aristotelian argumentation, it is clear that reality in 
its determination, namely the being of what is and the not being of what 
is not, demonstrates that there can be nothing intermediate in a 
contradiction, as pointed out by the fact that the discourse describing a 
certain state of affairs either it is in accordance with reality, then it is true, 
or it is not in accordance with reality, then it is false. That is the only 
possible way, during the axiom’s demonstration, to use the definition of 
true and false, because if the principle of excluded middle was deduced 
from this definition, its value as axiom would be denied. 
Alexander’s analysis is completely different, as we can infer from his 
comment: 
1. To show that there is nothing intermediate of a contradiction [Aristotle] begins 
using at first this argument. He defines what is the true and the false and assumes 
( ) that the true is the saying that what is is and that what is not is not, 
the false is the saying that what is is not or that what is not is, among these some 
are affirmations others are negations. 
2. One who says that this intermediate is or is not, if it is something in general (for 
this, indeed, [Aristotle states] “hence, also those who say that this is or is not”, he 
means the intermediate), it is clear that he can say the truth or false. Indeed, 
anyone who makes a statement about something and says that the same thing is or 
is not, says the true or the false. In this case this is impossible; in fact, those who 
say that what is or what is not is or is not, were the ones telling the truth, namely 
                                                                                                                                  
is not the same as saying unconditionally that it is of necessity. Similarly with what is 
not. And the same account holds for contradictories: everything necessarily is or is not, 
and will be or will not be; but one cannot divide and say that one or the other is 
necessarily. I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle 
tomorrow; but it is not necessarily for a sea-battle to take place tomorrow, nor for one 
not to take place – though it is necessarily for one to take place or not to take place” (
), trans. by J.L. Ackrill, in Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 52-53. 
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the ones saying either an affirmation or a negation, but what is intermediate in the 
contradiction is neither of these. 
3. This is the meaning of the discourse, that the ones, who say that what is and 
what is not is or is not, tell the true and tell the false, as was defined, but the one 
who says that the intermediate of the contradiction is or is not neither says that 
what is is or is not nor that what is not [is or is not], since the intermediate 
between what is and what is not is neither what is nor what is not; therefore, the 
one who predicates the being of the same thing or the not being could neither say 
the true nor the false. Likewise, also if someone does not predicate the being or 
the not being of the same thing, but something else. In fact, even when he is 
predicating something else of the same thing he says the true or the false, since 
the same thing must be or not be, if he who predicates something of the same 
thing is going to say the true or the false, but the intermediate of what is and of 
what is not and of contradiction neither is something that is nor something that is 
not.20 
This long passage is divided into three steps, as has been shown. The 
first step is the definition of true and false. Alexander points out that 
Aristotle starts using this argument and quotes the famous definition of 
                                                        
20 Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph. 328,19-329,4 Hayduck:
 
(translation by the Author). In this case I diverge from Madigan’s translation of  
with ‘it is the case’ and of  with ‘it is not the case’, and also from Casu’s one of 
the word  with ‘enunciati contraddittori’ and  with ‘termine intermedio’, 
because these are not so necessary. See Madigan, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, On 
Aristotle Metaphysics 4, p. 123; Casu, “Commento al libro Γ”, p. 773.  
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these concepts given by Aristotle, explaining that some expressions in 
the definition are affirmations while others are negations. 
The second step of the argument is the paraphrase of the 
Aristotelian text. From Alexander’s point of view, Aristotle’s argument 
regards someone saying that the intermediate is or is not something, if it 
is admitted, but not granted, that the intermediate is something. This 
person, who says something of the intermediate, will say the true or the 
false, as everyone who states something but, in this case, it is impossible 
because of the nature of intermediate. 
The Alexandrian exegesis is found more properly in the third step. 
In his opinion, indeed, the Aristotelian argument consists in observing 
that the intermediate of the contradiction is neither what is nor what is 
not: so anyone who says something about the intermediate cannot say 
neither true nor false, because only what is and what is not may be the 
subject of a true or false sentence. 
Now let us consider more in detail the Alexandrian reconstruction 
of the argument to grasp how it is different from the Aristotelian text. As 
mentioned, Alexander begins by noting that Aristotle, to demonstrate 
that there is nothing intermediate of contradiction, uses the following 
argument based on the definition of the true and the false, which 
Alexander reports in a way very close to the original. 
Even if the texts of the two authors examined so far appear 
equivalent, there is a difference. While Aristotle says that the principle is 
evident for those who define the true and the false, laying out a 
definition of these concepts, Alexander points out that Aristotle defines 
these concepts and assumes ( ) that the true is a certain thing and 
the false another one.  
The difference is of some importance. As regards to the meaning 
which could be given to the verb , I propose to choose the 
more technical one, namely the meaning which indicates the 
‘assumption’ of a syllogistic premise, as Aristotle theorized in the Posterior 
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Analytics.21 Firstly, this meaning is also in other passages of the same 
commentary of Alexander. Moreover the translations into modern 
languages point out precisely this sense of the verb, translating it with ‘to 
assume’22. Secondly, what is assumed is a premise and it is necessary to 
take a premise only during a deductive process of demonstration. The 
definition of truth and falsehood is not a simple discourse about these 
concepts, but a specifically one which clarifies what must be intended as 
truth and falsehood. So, if a definition is the starting point of an 
argumentation, as it seems to be, then this can only be a premise of a 
scientific syllogism, that is a demonstration in a strict sense. This seems 
to be the only possible role and therefore it is a real ‘assumption’. 
Thirdly, and consequently, it is even possible to understand the 
conjunction , that introduces the verb , as explicative and 
translate it with ‘namely’. This reinforces the use of the definition of true 
and false as premise, because it introduces a statement that explains the 
specific meaning of those two concepts. In fact, definitions always act as 
                                                        
21 See Aristot. An. Post. I 2, 72a 18-30: “If it must be grasped by anyone who is 
going to learn anything whatever, I call it an axiom (there are items of this kind); for it 
is of this sort of item in particular that we normally use this name. A posit which 
assumes either of the parts of a contradictory pair – what I mean is that something is or 
that something is not – I call a supposition. A posit which does not I call a definition. 
Definitions are posits (arithmeticians posit that a unit is what is quantitatively 
indivisible), but they are not suppositions (for what a unit is and that a unit is are not 
the same). Given that you must be convinced about some object and know it in so far 
as you possess a deduction of the sort we call a demonstration, and given that there is 
such a deduction in so far as these items – the items from which it proceeds – are the 
case, then you must not only already know the primitives (either all or some of them) – 
you must actually know them better. For something always holds better of that because 
of which it holds: e.g. that because of which we love somethings is better loved” 
(
), trans. J. Barnes, in Aristotle, 
Posterior Analytics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 19942 (19751).  
22 See Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph. 238, 18; 239, 6; 34; 240, 21-22 Hayduck; see 
Madigan, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 4, p. 123 and Casu, 
“Commento al libro Γ”, p. 773. 
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premises in demonstrations. However, the demonstration that Aristotle 
develops is a particular one, because it is a proof by refutation of an 
axiom, so subject to all the same requirements as the demonstration of 
the principle of non-contradiction. That is to say that you cannot state 
anything to demonstrate an axiom without making a petitio principii. So, if 
the interlocutor agrees to pronounce a name and to give it a specific 
meaning, he is responsible for the petition.23 Similarly, in the case of the 
principle of excluded middle the interlocutor is in charge of the petition. 
In fact, when he admits that a noun has a specific meaning, he is 
attributing the meaning to the noun. So he believes that the noun has a 
certain meaning and does not have any other, but he is also assuming 
that it is not necessary to exclude the intermediate between meaning 
(affirmation) a certain thing and not meaning (negation) any other; 
indeed, this intermediate does not exist. This difference is, in my 
opinion, an early indicator of how Alexander interprets the argument – 
namely as a deductive argument – coherently with his conception of 
metaphysics as a demonstrative science. Therefore, we must read the 
Alexandrian exegesis from this perspective to properly understand his 
illustration. 
To conclude this first step dedicated to the reconstruction of 
Aristotle’s argument, Alexander notes that “among these” some are 
affirmations and some negations, probably meaning among the 
propositions which are used to define true and false. This way he states 
that the things which are true or false are affirmations or negations. 
Regarding the second step, Alexander remarks that “one who says 
that this intermediate is or is not”, namely one who attributes the being 
to the intermediate – if this is something in general – can only say the 
true or the false. So Alexander considers that the interlocutor is 
attributing a predicate to the intermediate, if we admit without granting 
the existence of an intermediate. This is confirmed, according to 
Alexander, by Aristotle’s quotation reported. However, it is remarkable 
                                                        
23 See Aristot. Metaph. Γ 4, 1006a 5-28. 
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that the quotation does not coincide entirely with the Metaphysics text as it 
has been transmitted and on which, in this case, the critical editions 
agree. In Aristotle we read “ ”, while in 
Alexander we have “ ”. As is easy to note, 
he adds the pronoun , addition that is only found in his text and 
that may be due to a difference in the actual copy that he had, but could 
also be due to quoting from memory. In any case, the presence of this 
pronoun, since it can be read as a subject of the verbs , 
supports Alexander’s interpretation. 
If we consider that, as Alexander states, the pronoun  replaces 
, then Aristotle, according to Alexander, derives from the 
definition of the true and the false the necessity for anyone who says that 
the intermediate is or is not, to say something true or false. However, 
Alexander explains, in the case of the intermediate that is impossible, 
because “everyone who makes a statement about something and says 
that the same thing is or is not, says the true or the false”. Referring 
indeed to the definition previously established and assumed, it was 
determined that those who say that what is is and who say that what is 
not is not, are telling the truth, because anyone who makes an 
affirmation or a negation says the true or the false, but the intermediate 
is none “of these”. 
It is not clear which noun the pronoun ‘these’ replaces. Moreover, 
even though Alexander does put forth an interpretation within his 
paraphrase, it is not, to the eyes of a contemporary reader, less obscure 
than Aristotle’s text. However, Alexander himself realizes how difficult 
the argument is and, for that reason, goes on with the commentary to 
explain the meaning of what he has just said. 
In fact, the third step of the text quoted is more properly dedicated 
to his exegesis. Alexander begins by setting a first point that emerges 
from the definition employed, namely anyone who is talking about what 
is or what is not and saying that it is or it is not, is also telling the truth or 
falsehood. 
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In the subsequent passage, he notes that the one who, however, says 
that the intermediate of the contradiction is or is not, expresses none of 
what above settled by the definition of the true and the false, in fact he 
says neither that what is is nor that what is not is not, because the 
intermediate of the contradiction can be neither what is nor what is not. 
The intermediate, indeed, is intermediate between affirmation and 
negation, so it is intermediate between a certain affirmation and its 
negation. 
The refutation, in Alexander’s opinion, is that anyone, who preaches 
that the intermediate is or is not can neither tell the true nor the false, 
because, as mentioned above, he neither says that what is is or is not, nor 
that what is not is or is not. So, the unacceptable consequence, in 
Alexander’s opinion, is that the interlocutor is making a statement that is 
neither true nor false. Obviously there is the same result if the 
interlocutor does not say that the intermediate is or is not, but says 
something else. However, even with another predicate, he would not be 
able to say something true or false, because the same subject which is 
affirmed or negated must be or not be, and the intermediate between 
what is and what is not, namely the intermediate of a contradiction, is 
neither something that is nor something that is not. 
According to the Alexandrian reconstruction of the argument, the 
fact that the intermediate neither is nor is not constitutes the error found 
in the thesis of the interlocutor, but Aristotle studies this possibility in 
depth only later. Instead, in this first issue, Alexander admits the 
existence of such an intermediate and shows that such an admission 
entails, as an unacceptable result, saying neither true nor false, so he 
drops this conclusion under an additional condition: “if he who 
predicates something of the same thing is going to say the true or the 
false”. 
This condition is very interesting because it reveals that the 
definition of true and false acts as premise and, at the same time, that the 
Alexandrian reconstruction of the argument is a deductive one. But, 
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from Aristotle’s point of view, the argument added to prove an axiom 
cannot and must not be deductive. So Alexander seems to rely on what 
has emerged in a subsequent proof of the principle of excluded middle. 
In this proof, Aristotle considers how an intermediate in the 
contradiction could exist and, once admitted its existence, he defines the 
intermediate by the double negation of the contradictories. 
The difference between the two authors must be traced back to 
Alexander’s particular conception of metaphysics as a demonstrative 
science.24 Aristotle would have understood the topic in the way that 
Alexander intends with difficulty, because of a methodological issue and 
content. 
Regarding the methodological aspect, as pointed out earlier, the kind 
of proof that the principle of excluded middle as axiom requires is the 
same as the principle of non-contradiction, namely a particular 
application of the demonstration by refutation and not a deductive 
argument. Otherwise, as already noted, the meaning of the principle 
would be the definition of true and false, not the ‘necessary duality’ of 
affirmation and negation, as is clear in Aristotle’s formula. 
Regarding the doctrines of Aristotle, it is impossible to prove the 
non-existence of an intermediate between affirmation and negation, 
showing that about this intermediate one can say neither the true nor the 
false, because of the priority of what is over the discourse about it. As is 
clear in the following passage: 
Concerning the facts this is about being united or divided; therefore, the one who 
believes that what is divided is divided and that what is united is united will say 
the true, however the one who has a contrary opinion to the facts, will say the 
false; so when is or is not a statement true or false? We must examine what we 
mean by this. Indeed, it is not for the fact that we really think that you are white 
that you are white, but because you are white we, who assert this, say the truth.25 
                                                        
24 See Bonelli, Alessandro di Afrodisia. 
25 Aristot. Metaph. Θ 10, 1051b 2-9: 
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The passage is well known and shows how it is always the reality to 
determine the truth or the falsehood of a statement, not vice versa, as the 
criterion of accordance sentences.26 For this reason, Aristotle would 
hardly refuse the thesis of the interlocutor just because, talking about the 
intermediate of the contradiction, he cannot say the true nor the false. In 
fact, if we admit that something, that is neither what is nor what is not, 
exists, we must also admit that it is possible to truly talk about it, namely 
saying that it neither is nor is not. We will therefore be refuted by those 
who we wanted to refute. Moreover, Aristotle himself, in one of the 
following arguments added to demonstrate the principle known as of 
excluded middle, shows how those who admit the existence of an 
intermediate between affirmation and negation are forced to admit that 
there is also an intermediate between true and false, between being and 
not being, between generation and corruption.27 
It is remarkable that the Alexandrian interpretation of the principle 
known as of excluded middle has become one of the most common 
interpretations of this Aristotelian doctrine. So, the meaning of the 
principle known as of excluded middle is currently considered the one 
given by Alexander, namely that the contradictory pairs cannot both be 
false. This meaning is accepted, in particular, by those who propose a 
logical-philosophical approach to the text.28 However, the meaning of 
the principle formulated by Aristotle precedes the meaning established 
by Alexander. In fact, the impossibility that both the contradictories are 
false supposes that the contradictories are only two, as stated in the 
Aristotelian principle. This meaning is not obvious and cannot be 
inferred from the principle of non-contradiction. 
                                                                                                                                  
 
26 On contradiction see Aristot. Cat. 10, 13b 12-33; on being as true see Aristot. 
Metaph. Δ 7, 1017a 31-35; E 4, 1027b 20-23.  
27 See Aristot. Metaph. Γ 7, 1012a 5-9. 
28 See Whitaker, in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. Contradiction and dialectic, p. 79-82; 
Gourinat, “Principe de contradiction”, p. 70; Cavini, “Principia contradictionis”, p. 124. 
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Also, the two ideas that the first proof assumes as premise the 
definition of true and false and that the refutation consists in the 
impossibility of saying something “neither true nor false” have become 
part of the most famous commentaries on the Metaphysics,29 and are often 
supported by the most recent logical-philosophical studies.30 However, 
these ideas cannot be attributed to Aristotle in reason of both the 
methodological question and the inconsistency with other doctrines. 
Alexander’s interpretation itself shows a distinct and original 
perspective, which is close to present-day logical-philosophical studies. 
The reason why must be traced back to his conception of philosophy as 
a demonstrative science. In his view, indeed, the first philosophy should 
avail of the syllogisms carefully described in the Analytics, but this is a 
philosophy original to Alexander, expressed in his own commentary in 
Metaphysica. 
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